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Should That Count? Fairness Judgments of Resource Allocations Accounting for
Structural Sexism
At work, equitable allocations, that is, those that align outcomes (e.g., rewards) with
inputs or contributions (e.g., effort, performance), are judged as fairest. Consequently, managers
often rely on objective performance indicators (e.g., customer satisfaction scores) to align
recipients’ outcomes with contributions. However, due to structural inequities, many seemingly
objective indicators are biased. In particular, based solely on their gender, women often rank
lower on performance indicators, even for otherwise identical levels of performance.
To account for such inequities, a manager may allocate more resources to a woman with
lower performance indicators, arguing that the indictor is misrepresenting her true contributions.
Would such a decision be judged as fair by observers? On the one hand, as adjusting allocations
to account for structural sexism aligns outcomes with true contributions, such adjustments should
be seen as equitable and thus judged as fairer. On the other hand, such adjustments are based on
statistical abstractions, often only observable in the aggregate, and are out of the control of the
recipients of a specific allocation. Thus, such adjustments may be seen as irrelevant in judges’
private equity calculations.
Current formulations based on equity theory do not provide a clear prediction. We
propose that fairness judgments of decisions to account (vs. not) for structural sexism in resource
allocations are based on judgers’ work success beliefs, that is, implicit theories about the
generalized causes of success (cf. Krijnen et al., 2020). We theorize that people vary on three
such beliefs: (a) Rewarding, viewing success as caused by internal, controllable, and predictable
individual factors, such as hard work, ability, and effort; (b) Random, viewing success as caused
by external chance factors, such as luck or accidents; and (c) Rigged, viewing success as caused
by external predictable factors, such as discrimination and favoritism. We posit that those who
endorse Rewarding beliefs judge managers accounting for structural sexism as less fair than
those who do not whereas those who endorse Rigged beliefs judge managers accounting for
structural sexism as fairer than those who do not.
We find support for our arguments in a series of pre-registered lab experiments. In Study
1 (N = 180), and Study 2 (N = 633), participants took on the role of a senior manager (S1:
president of a student organization; S2: Senior HR Director of a financial services company) and
evaluated an award decision (S1: student scholarships; S2: employee bonus) made by a male
junior manager allocating $24,000 among two candidates, one male and one female. Participants
were informed that their organization issued a report establishing that over the last 10 years
females (vs. males) obtained consistently lower scores on a specific criterion (S1: SAT scores;
S2: customer satisfaction ratings). Participants learned the two applicants’ scores on the relevant
criteria. In both studies, the two candidates had identical scores on all criteria except the one in
the report (S1: SAT scores; S2: customer satisfaction ratings). Participants heard one of three
decisions from the junior manager: the allocation based on raw performance condition where the
male was awarded more due to a higher score on the key metric, the allocation accounting for
structural sexism condition, where the female was awarded more due to structural sexism on the
key metric, or a control condition where the female was awarded more due to information
learned outside of the review process. We measured people’s generalized beliefs about work
success and found interactions between the condition and Rewarding and Rigged beliefs (see
example results from Study 1b in Figure 1. We are in the process of conducting additional
studies which we hope to present in the conference, including ones that more directly account for

self-interest, rely on within-person designs, and explore the effects of success beliefs on decision
to account for structural biases against men.
As research on allies typically focuses on individual acts of encouragement and support
(Brown & Ostrove, 2013; Sabat et al., 2014) or on actor-less HR policies and processes (Madsen
et al., 2019), our work shifts the focus of allyship research from interpersonal support to active
challenge of structural barriers. Moreover, organizational fairness scholarship can only
meaningfully advance inclusive and bias-free organizations to the extent that distributive justice
discussions are reformulated to acknowledge systemic biases and we take a step in this direction.
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Figure 1
Interactive effect of rewarding or rigged beliefs and condition on fairness judgments
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Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Bars represent standard errors.

